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AN INFORMATION PRIVACY APPROACH TO REGULATING
THE MIDDLEMEN IN THE LUCRATIVE GAMETES MARKET
SUNNI YUEN*
1. INTRODUCTION
An ad in an upstate New York college newspaper reads: "Egg
Donor Sought. Attractive, Intelligent, Jewish, SAT score 1370 (or
equivalent), 21-29 years of age, at least 5'4" tall and no more than
average weight. Compensation- $75,000."1 In a Baghdad hospital,
a twenty-two year old taxi-driver awakens to find that he is "one
kidney lighter and $1,400 ... richer after a three-hour operation."2
In today's global economy, both human reproductive cells and
kidneys traverse supply chains that span multiple borders. How-
ever, because various national laws regulate or forbid transactions
of body parts, 3 and the extraction and transplant processes require
* J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. Econom-
ics, 2005, Cornell University. A special thanks to Tiffany for her unwavering en-
thusiasm and support from conception of the topic to publication. I am also very
grateful to the editors of the Journal of International Law for their hard work in
readying this comment for publication.
1 See Missy Kurzweil, Op-Ed, Egg Donor Sought Don't Miss Out, CORNELL
DAILY SUN, Sept. 21, 2004, available at http://www.comellsun.com/node/12494
(quoting an advertisement that appeared in the same publication the day before).
2 Saleh Al Jibouri & Colin Freeman, Black Market Organ Trade is Baghdad's New
Growth Industry, TELEGRAPH, May 22, 2005, available at http://www
.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtnl?xml=/ news/2005/05/22/wirq22.xml.
3 There are myriad markets for human body parts, including body parts for
medical research and education (i.e., Moore's hairy cell line and cadavers for first
year medical students), postmortem tissues which can be reprocessed into surgi-
cal products necessary for operations, blood and DNA. See generally MICHELE
GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 160 (2006)
(discussing the underground body broker trade); R. Alta Charo, Skin and Bones:
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highly technical skills, the typical transaction in the human body
parts4 market is rarely an arms-length one.5 Rather, the market op-
erates through complex networks of both legitimate and illegal in-
termediaries such as tissue banks, clinics, processing companies,
and brokers.6 These intermediaries need not directly handle the
transfer of the body part. However, in arranging the transaction,
they play a direct role in transferring personal information 7- often
Post-Mortem Markets in Human Tissue, 26 NOVA L. REV. 421 (2002) (discussing the
medical research and processing product end uses for human tissue retrieved at
death). However, the scope of this Comment is limited to transactions in which
body parts are largely unaltered, and exchanged with the intent of being used for
their original or natural use. Further, the focus will be on body parts exchanged
between living persons; even though cadavers are a common source of body
parts, it is presumed that one does not maintain information privacy interests past
death. But see Clay Calvert, The Privacy of Death: An Emergent Jurisprudence and Le-
gal Rebuke to Media Exploitation and a Voyeuristic Culture, 26 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV.
133, 134 (2006) (distinguishing information privacy from the emerging privacy of
death jurisprudence in which relatives of the decedent are wrangling over "what
others see about the death of [their] late family members").
4 This Comment focuses on the information privacy aspects of commodifi-
able body parts -that is, largely unaltered human body components which are
currently exchanged in both legitimate and black markets. While information de-
rived from body parts such as the cell line derived from Moore's hairy cell leuke-
mia sample have value, exchanges of such information amongst researchers are
encapsulated in the form of such intellectual property as trade secrets and patents.
Moreover, the value of the proprietary rights in such information stems at least in
part from the researchers' efforts and manipulation of the source material. De-
spite this Lockean argument, one must recognize that "[t]here is substantial re-
search value both in unidentified material (i.e., material that is not linked to an in-
dividual) and in material linked to an identifiable person and his or her
continuing medical record."- R. Alta Charo, Legal Characterizations of Human Tis-
sue, in TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE: ETHICS, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 101, 112
(Youngner et al. eds., 2004) (emphasis added). "Sometimes, however, it is neces-
sary to identify the source of the research sample, because the research value of
the material depends on linking findings regarding the biology of the sample with
updated information from medical or other records pertaining to its source." Id.
at 113.
5 To clarify, the parties to the arms-length transaction are the source ("do-
nor") and ultimate recipient of the body part.
6 This Comment refers to banks, clinics, and brokers interchangeably.
7 For the purposes of this Comment, personal information is defined as any
piece of information which can potentially be used to uniquely identify, contact,
or locate a single person. This includes but is not limited to financial information
such as social security and taxpayer numbers, genetic and biometric data, ad-
dresses, and health information. Privacy concerns arise when there are breaches
and abuse of the collection, storage, transfer, and uses of this uniquely identifiable
information. This definition is partially molded from the definition in the Euro-
pean Union Data Directive and the OECD Privacy Guidelines. Council Directive
95/46/EC, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, (Sept. 23, 1980), available at
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss2/5
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of a highly sensitive nature8 -relating to the body part's source
and recipient. At a minimum, medical information necessary for
determining compatibility between the source and recipient (such
as blood type) passes through the network of middlemen.9 Finan-
cial, genetic and other medical information are also often collected
and processed. 10 Moreover, in the case of gametes, because con-
sumers place a premium on obtaining information above and be-
yond bare-bones medical data, family histories and personality
trait information are also routed through the supply chain." In a
global market of suppliers, personal information is increasingly
bundled with the exchanged body parts. This development, cou-
pled with advances in medical and information technology, has




.html [hereinafter OECD Privacy Guidelines].
8 The OECD Privacy Guidelines also distinguish between sensitive and non-
sensitive personal data based on whether the nature of the data is treated as in-
herently sensitive; the drafters give medical records as an example. Id. See also
James T. Sunosky, Privacy Online: A Primer on the European Union's Directive and
United States' Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 9 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 80, 86
(2000) (noting the importance and sensitivity of "personal information specifying
medical or health conditions, racial or ethnic origin, [or] political opinions").
9 A kidney is only useful or valuable to the recipient insofar as its source has
compatible ABO blood group and an adequate number of similar human leuko-
cyte antigens ("HLA") and other minor antigens. See International Association of
Living Organ Donors, Inc., Living Kidney Donation: Now... About Your Health,
http://www.livingdonorsonline.org/kidney/kidney4.htm (last visited Nov. 17,
2007) (explaining how the HLA test determines compatibility).
10 Medical histories, covering the provider's parents' and grandparents' fit-
ness, longevity, and cause of death are particularly common. See N.W. Andrology
& Cryobank, Sperm Donor Selection Helpful Hints, http://www.nwcryobank
.com/donor selection.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (providing information on
what many look for when searching for a donor); ScientistDonor.com, Sperm Do-
nor Full Profile, http://www.scientistdonor.com/profile.htnl (last visited Nov.
17, 2007) (providing an example of a donor's answers to a comprehensive ques-
tionnaire); The Sperm Bank of California, Donor Profile: 3161, http://www
.thespermbankofca.org/profiles/donor3161.PDF (last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (pre-
senting a typical sperm donor profile, which includes family medical history).
11 See Sandra Barney, Accessing Medicalized Donor Sperm in the US and Britain:
An Historical Narrative, 8(2) SEXUALITIES 205, 212 (2005), available at
http://sexualities.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/8/2/205.pdf (reporting as an exam-
ple that Fairfax Cryobank offers discounted sperm on the grounds that the donor
had provided less information than that contained in a typical donor profile,
which encompasses such information as "the condition of the donor's male rela-
tives' hair, his favorite animal... and his self-reported musical abilities").
12 As recently as January 17, 2007, President George W. Bush "urged Con-
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This Comment argues that an information privacy-based ap-
proach 13 to regulating the middleman in the gametes market will
facilitate a harmonized approach for the existing quasi-grey mar-
ket14 in reproductive tissue. An information privacy approach will
also address the currently neglected cross-border data transfer is-
sues in the human body part trade. Moreover, because this ap-
proach eschews the varying and sometimes conflicting cultural
and religious perceptions of ownership that ensnare a property in-
terest-based approach,15 it may serve as a regulatory model beyond
the gametes context for a plausible active tissue and organ market.
Section Two sets forth the concept of an information privacy inter-
est in the human body, as distinct from the property interest. Sec-
tion Three examines the gametes market, and the human tissue
regulatory landscape in the United States and abroad. The infor-
mation privacy issues of the global gametes trade are also scruti-
nized. In Section Four, the information privacy regulatory ap-
proach is developed, using the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development Privacy Guidelines as a framework.
Section Four then contemplates which existing international bodies
gress to pass long-stalled legislation to safeguard genetic privacy" so that genetic
information willingly shared by individuals would not be exploited in improper
ways. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, President Calls for Genetic Privacy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2007, at A14. Although President Bush's statement specifically addresses ge-
netic information (information derived from genetic testing), it is applicable to in-
formation beyond the DNA itself (the "building blocks" or encoded instructions
for the development and function of living organisms).
13 An information privacy approach focuses on "precluding the dissemina-
tion or misuse of sensitive and confidential information." Dorothy J. Glancy, Pri-
vacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 295, 321 n.101 (2004) (quoting Hill v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (Cal. 1994)).
14 "Quasi-grey" is an appropriate adjective because while some jurisdictions
prohibit the outright sale of gametes (i.e. monetary consideration in exchange for
the gametes), they permit compensation for the provider's time and efforts -and
absent government-imposed caps, this compensation can range from $4,500 to
$50,000. See Maria Cristina Caballero, Spar Takes on Boom in Baby Biz: Harvard
Business School Professor Delves into 'Commerce of Conception,' HARV. U. GAZETTE,
Mar. 16, 2006, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2006/03.16/
01-babybiz.html (describing the field of reproductive technologies as a booming
economic sector, in spite of the "denials of authorities and the difficulty for most
to conceive of a child as a commercial product"); see also Kerry Howley, A Market
in Morals, THE AMERICAN, Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://www.american.com/
archive/2007/january-0107/a-market-in-morals/ ("If you're a European citizen,
chances are your country of origin either proscribes compensation for donor eggs,
[or] prohibits the anonymous sale of sperm .... But reproductive freedom may lie
just a high-speed train away, over a border and into a different legal regime.").
15 See infra Section 2.
[Vol. 29:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol29/iss2/5
MIDDLEMEN IN THE GAMETES MARKET
are best suited to administer this approach. After concluding that
the divergent cultural and moral views of gametes make such a
promulgation impossible, Section Four argues that within the
United States, the Food and Drug Administration should be re-
sponsible for applying this regulatory approach to the typical mid-
dleman in the gametes market: the sperm and ova banks. Finally,
Section Five briefly contemplates the extension of the information
privacy regulatory approach for a hypothetical legitimate organs
market.
2. PRIVACY AND PROPERTY INTERESTS IN THE BODY
The concepts of bodily autonomy and ownership are inherent
in the principle of "spatial privacy," which concerns physical ac-
cess to one's body and personal spaces.16 As Professor Anita Allen
explains:
The human body, like information, is an object of pri-
vacy.... The general rule within legal doctrine is that, in
the absence of consent, intentionally harmful or offensive
physical contact with another is tortuous battery; uninvited
entry onto another's property is trespass; and intrusion into
anothers' [sic] seclusion, especially by searching, prying, or
remote surveillance, is an invasion of privacy.
17
Procuring gametes, blood and other bodily material necessarily
requires some degree of physical access to one's body and personal
space.18 As long as the source and recipient of the body parts con-
sent to this physical access by the doctor performing the extraction
and transplant, spatial privacy is not a concern.
However, the harvesting of gametes also implicates genetic in-
formation because gametes are, by definition, cells which hold half
16 Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC
SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 46
(Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
17 Id.
18 Some methods of extracting body parts are more intrusive than others-
sperm, for instance, may be harvested without actual physical intrusion with nee-
dles. See IDANT Labs., Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.idant.com/
fertilityServices/faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (specifying a preference for
specimens obtained by manual stimulation).
2007]
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the genetic information 19 needed for human procreation.20 Genetic
information entails an information privacy interest because "[t]o re-
quest a family history or... the results of genetic tests is to ask
about personal information" 21 that an individual may feel it impor-
tant to secure from access by others. Further, genetic information
is intrinsically linked to our identities because it is unique to us,
dictates our appearance, reveals links to past and present relatives,
and influences the disposition of our health and that of our off-
spring.22 Thus, information privacy reflects an individual's ability
to control the manner in which others access and use the informa-
tion that is intertwined with his personhood. 23
Professor Sonia Suter accordingly distinguishes between prop-
erty and privacy on the basis of control: property connotes control
within the marketplace, while privacy connotes control over access
to the individual self.24 Central to the Anglo-Saxon construct of
"property" is the notion that something may be detached and
alienable from the self. On the other hand, privacy revolves
around the connection, or relationships we build and define
through the amount we grant to others, of access to our selves.25
Nonetheless, property and privacy interests are not mutually ex-
clusive. Some scholars and the drafters of the Genetic Privacy
Act 26 justify the creation of property interests in personal informa-
19 Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Under-
standing of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 738 (2004) ("Genetic infor-
mation includes information contained within the DNA in our cells, information
present in family histories, information evident in visible traits such as eye color
and gender, and information present in medical records.").
20 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com/
dictionary/gamete (last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (defining gamete as "a mature male
or female germ cell usually possessing a haploid chromosome set [which contains
half the genetic information] and capable of initiating formation of a new diploid
individual [whose cells contain full genetic information] by fusion with a gamete
of the opposite sex") (citations omitted).
21 GRAEME LAURIE, GENETIC PRIVACY: A CHALLENGE TO MEDICO-LEGAL NORMS
142 (2002).
22 Suter, supra note 19, at 738-39.
23 Id. at 739 ("[Privacy] empowers us by giving us control over the manner in
which others will use the information and the right to decide whether we want to
learn this information about ourselves.").
24 See id. at 737 (distinguishing between property and privacy on the grounds
of whether something is alienable from the self).
2 See id. at 769 ("Property provides control over a commodity; privacy pro-
vides control over the self and relationships that constitute the self.")
26 See GEORGE J. ANNAs ET AL., THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Pub. Health 1995), available at http://www.ornl.gov/
[Vol. 29:2
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tion because property rights function as a proxy for control over
access to the information. 27 However, given the miniscule transac-
tion costs involved in controlling access to the information, 28 this
justification is weak. Absent regulation mandating specific types
of record collection, it is relatively cheap for the individual to re-
strict access. Specifically, the individual can limit the amount of
information voluntarily disclosed or choose to disclose only to a
third party person or firm that is contractually obligated to safe-
guard that disclosed information from unauthorized access. Prop-
erty rights in personal information do not boost one's control over
access to the information. 29 Thus, it is information privacy interests
that ensure that no third parties may assume the gate-keeping role
in guarding access to oneself.
3. THE GAMETE MARKET
The scope of personal information collected in tandem with the
gametes varies with the extraction and supply processes and regu-
lations governing the gamete banks' practices. An overview of
gamete procurement processes and the international nature of the
gamete market reflects the value of and risks posed to the personal
information of the gamete provider.
sci/ techresources/ HumanGenome/ resource/privacy/ privacyl.html (providing
specifically that an individually identifiable DNA sample is the property of the
sample source) [hereinafter GPA].
27 See Suter, supra note 19, at 754 ("Control is central to informational pri-
vacy, and 'property' works as a proxy for such control.") (internal citations omit-
ted). Graeme Laurie explicates further:
Confidentiality is concerned with security of information.... To be con-
fidential, information must be in a state of limited access from individu-
als, groups, bodies and institutions generally. Confidentiality is charac-
terised by a relationship involving two or more individuals, one or more
of whom has undertaken - explicitly or implicitly - not to reveal to third
parties information concerning the other party to the relationship.
Laurie, supra note 21, at 212.
28 The costs of controlling access include costs relating to limiting collection
of the data and safeguarding the stored data from unauthorized access with
encryption technology. See generally Ben Malisow, Valuing Secure Access to Personal
Information, SECURITYFOCUS, Aug. 19, 2004, http://www.securityfocus.com/
infocus/1797 (explaining the ease with which personal information can be bought
without permission).
29 See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1283, 1293 (2000) ("If ownership of private property is power, however, calling
privacy rights 'property rights' offers the promise of magically vesting the power-
less with control over their personal data.").
2007] 533
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3.1. Process of Harvesting Sperm and Ova
3.1.1. Sperm - From Source to Delivery
The procurement process for sperm is long but technically
simple. Although sperm may be extracted through electro-
ejaculation or surgery, 30 such techniques are generally reserved for
infertile men; sperm is generally obtained through manual stimu-
lus by the provider.31 The sperm is typically stored via cryopreser-
vation,32 in which vials of the semen samples33 are diluted with
cryoprotectants 34 and lowered into liquid nitrogen freezers where
they are slowly cooled at rates of between 1°C/rnin and
100'C/min.35 Frozen at the low temperature of around -196°C, any
biochemical activity in the sperm, including those triggering cell
death, is stopped, therefore enabling storage of sperm for years.36
When a consumer purchases sperm (the unit being "straws" or vi-
als), the straw is removed from the freezer and thawed in a warm
water bath of up to 370 C.37 It is then delivered to the consumer and
30 See Cornell Univ. Dept. of Urology, Male Infertility - Electroejaculation,
http://www.cornellurology.com/infertility/srt/electroejaculation.shtml (de-
scribing such methods as testicular fine needle aspiration) (last visited Nov. 8,
2007).
31 See Rajasingam S. Jeyendran & Craig Niederberger, Sperm Procurement Methods
in SPERM COLLECTION AND PROCESSING METHODS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 9, 11-12 (Ra-
jasingam S. Jeyendran ed., 2003) (describing semen production and release).
32 See John K. Critser et al., Cryopreservation of Immature and Mature Gametes, in
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND NEW HORIZONS 144,
157 (Christopher J. De Jonge & Chirstopher L.R. Barratt eds., 2002) ("Spermatozoa
cryopreservation consists of a series of nonphysiological steps that involve hyper-
tonic CPA [cryoprotectant agent] addition, cooling, warming, and CPA re-
moval.").
33 The sperm bank portions out semen samples on the basis of sperm count
(concentration) and percent motility. See Oregon Health & Sci. Univ. Infertility
Lab, Semen Cryopreservation: Patient Information, http://www.fertilityoregon
.com/lab/process.htm#number (noting that each semen sample will yield up to
1.8 milliliters in a vial).
34 Cryoprotectant is a vitrification solution that lowers the freezing tempera-
ture and increases the viscosity of the semen sample so as to prevent damage to
the cellular membranes from crystal formation damage. See Critser et al., supra
note 32, at 147 (naming glycerol buffered with egg yolk-citrate medium as an ex-
ample).
35 See id.
36 See Joseph Feldschuh, et al., Successful Sperm Storage for 28 Years, 84
FERTILITY & STERILITY 1017.e3 (2005).
37 Oregon Health & Science University Infertility Lab, supra note 33.
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her physician to begin the impregnation process using assisted re-
productive technologies. 38
By contrast, the administrative aspect of bringing sperm "fit for
consumption" to the market is complex. An immense quantity of
medical and personal information is collected and analyzed by
sperm banks as part of their daily operations.39 Before undergoing
the actual procurement procedures, the sperm provider candidate
must undergo a preliminary and informal screening process that
scrutinizes his basic health,40 height, weight, age, 41 and educational
background.42 Candidates who pass this round are then instructed
38 See Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, Micromanipulation,
http://www.sart.org/GuideMicromanipulation.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2007).
39 The information collected fulfills this purpose in at least three ways. First,
the bank analyzes it to detect the susceptibility of the provider's DNA to geneti-
cally-linked diseases. Failure to do so would be akin to selling defective goods
with potentially dire health implications for the progeny conceived using the
sperm. See Johnson v. Cal. Cryobank, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(involving a suit for failure to disclose the risk that a child conceived from the
sperm sold by California Cryobank was at high risk of developing autosomal
dominant polycystic kidney disease, a genetically transferable life-threatening
condition).
Second, the information is an essential price valuation tool as banks can pri-
oritize the providers based on the immaculateness of their personal and family
health records, and other desirable traits such as green eyes. See Buying Babies, Bit
by Bit, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2006, at 117 [hereinafter Buying Babies] (reporting
that one sperm bank also offers "exclusive worldwide rights to a donor for
$75,000").
Third, the information itself is commoditized as part of the goods and services
the bank delivers to consumers. See id. at 118 ("Basic information about donors [at
California Cryobank]-height, weight, colouring, occupation comes free [with pur-
chase of the specimen], but further information must be paid for. A facial-features
report, listing such attributes as 'nostril flare' (narrow, average or large), costs
$12 ...").
40 Basic medical questions during this screening process are intended to filter
out any prospective providers with known genetically-linked diseases such as
cancer or diabetes.
41 California Cryobank justifies the age restriction thusly:
Donors must be between the ages of 19 and 39. According to the Cryo-
bank's medical director, Cappy Rothman, MD, "While a man's fertility
does not automatically decline after the age of 39, men under that age are
more likely to consistently produce superior quality of sperm necessary
for successful freezing and thawing." The American Association of Tis-
sue Banks sets age 39 as the maximum age for donors.
California Cryobank, Donor Qualification Process, http://www.cryobank.com/
donorinfo.cfm?page=43 (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter California Cryo-
bank Donor Page].
42 Educational information is a function of market demand, since most con-
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to submit paperwork on sexual history, drug use,43 and additional
non-health information such as "what would send [one] ... to an
ATM at three in the morning."44 While the paperwork often in-
volves filling out lengthy questionnaires reminiscent of ones com-
mon to online dating web profiles, middleman banks are quite
vigilant in collecting and conducting a thorough medical back-
ground check. Mindful of its legal liability, 45 its public image, and
consumer confidence,46 California Cryobank requires candidates
to:
[C]omplete a three-generation medical and genetic history
(better known as the "long profile"), meet with several
people for interviews, including [a] genetic counselor, have
a complete physical exam and have various laboratory tests
[that screen for sexually transmitted diseases including
gonorrhea, cytomegalovirus (herpes),47 hepatitis, HIV, cys-
tic fibrosis, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and syphilis].48
Candidates also must provide multiple semen samples to the
middleman bank.49 The clinic analyzes the quality and viscosity of
4 --. c -.. -rc;h orp, a. a desirable attribute and oroxv of
intelligence. Other market demand attributes include physical features (height,
eye and hair color), athletic ability, and ethnicity. See, e.g., David Andrew Stoler,
Who's Your Daddy?, THE PHOENIX, Aug. 9, 2006, http://thephoenix.com/article
.aspx?id=19956 (discovering that the writer's Jewish heritage was the trump card
in passing the initial screening process).
43 See id.
44 See id.
45 The middle-man bank or clinic may be subject to liability for negligence,
failure to disclose, and false representation and fraud as to sufficient screening of
the sperm provider. But see Johnson v. Cal. Cryobank, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 666
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that it was the gene contained within the sperm used
to conceive the child, and not Cryobank's improper approval of the donor, that
caused the child's inherited abnormalities).
46 Understandably, banks want to undertake safeguards to assure consumers
of the quality of their goods and services. Screening for genetic diseases, infectious
diseases, and cytomegalus virus is conmon. See, e.g., California Cryobank, Genet-
ics Tests, http://www.cryobank.com/gentests.cfm?page=44 (last visited Nov. 8,
2007) (listing the genetic screening test performed on donors).
47 See Lab Tests Online, Cytomegalovirus, http://www.labtestsonline.org/
understanding/analytes/cmv/test.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007) (detailing the
process for testing of antigens).
48 California Cryobank Donor Page, supra note 41.
49 Specifically, the sperm provider is directed to wash his hands before ejacu-
lating and deposit the entire specimen into a urine-sized collection cup. Any lost
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the semen to determine whether to accept the sperm provider into
a full-time donor program. 50 It is not always clear whether the in-
formation or specimens collected from "rejected" sperm providers
are destroyed or disposed of, and if so, how.51
The screening process continues even after the sperm provider
enters a contractual agreement 52 with the middleman clinic. All
sperm is stored for at least six months under quarantine while the
sperm providers undergo health monitoring and testing every
three months.53
3.1.2. Ova - From Source to Delivery
The technical procurement of ova is far more complicated be-
cause the egg follicles must be punctured with a needle and their
contents extracted.54 Further, in contrast to the vast quantities of
sperm that can be released per ejaculation, the female body only
naturally matures and releases one egg per month. Since men-
portions of the specimen released onto the hand, clothing, chair, floor, or counter-
top must be discarded to prevent contamination. See Stoler, supra note 42.
50 California Cryobank generally looks for sperm providers who have "five
times the normal range" of sperm count per ejaculation on the grounds that a por-
tion of sperm is lost in the freezing and thawing process. Stoler, supra note 42.
The rationale for selecting "robust sperm" is that such sperm is more likely to be
effective and survive the cryopreservation storage process. See Donor Semen Qual-
ity Varies Within and Between Banks, FERTILrrY WEEKLY, Aug. 5, 2002 (summarizing
studies which show that the freezing and thawing process of cryopreserved
sperm is "usually associated with diminished viability, motility, and functional
ability of the sperm" although "[siperm susceptibility to cryodamage appears to
vary between individuals and often between samples of a given donor") (internal
quotations omitted).
51 The Author was unable to find any sperm bank and broker websites, or
applications to donate, addressing disposal (as opposed to retention) of the re-
jected gametes and candidate profile information. California Cryogenics, how-
ever, does destroy all records of sperm donors once their samples are sold. See US
Sperm Banks Fret About Government Meddling, BIOEDGE, Oct. 3, 2007,
http://www.australasianbioethics.org/Newsletters/268-2007-10-03.html.
52 A typical contractual agreement contains three parts: (1) authorization for
release of semen; (2) personal and financial health; and (3) frozen donor semen
purchase agreement, which outlines the terms and conditions for utilizing donor
semen specimens. California Cryobank, Client Accounts, http://www.cryobank
.com/spbanknonphys.cfm?page=45 (last visited Jan. 3, 2007) (stating that both the
client orientation and client agreement forms must be completed and signed prior
to placing orders).
53 Id.
54 See M. SARA ROSENTHAL, THE FERTILITY SOURCEBOOK 219 (3d ed. 2002), avail-
able at http:/ /www.webmd.com/content/article/4/1680_51226.htm (explaining
that the egg retrieval procedure is identical to that for in vitro fertilization).
2007]
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strual cycles vary from person to person, egg providers are subject
to hormonal injections such as Lupron to suppress and thereby
synchronize their cycles with those of the recipients.5 5 This is fol-
lowed by ovarian hyper-stimulation treatment, which involves
daily hormonal injections that trigger the follicles to mature and re-
lease a dozen or more eggs at a time.56 The next step is an injection
of human chorionic gonadotropin.5 7 Thirty-six hours later, the egg
provider will "undergo the egg retrieval under mild sedation" 58 in
which a needle will be inserted through the vaginal wall to reach
the ovarian follicles, and apply suction to extract the ova with the
guide of an ultrasound image.59
It is far more difficult to "bank" extracted eggs than to "bank"
sperm. Until December 31, 2005, when the first baby conceived
with a frozen egg from a commercial ova bank was born, 60 mid-
dleman clinics merely sold broker services by facilitating informa-
tion exchange between those interested in giving eggs and those
receiving them.61 This was because cryropreservation technology
5 Lupron effectively "shuts down the ovaries so that no eggs ripen or are
released." Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted
Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human Sperm
and Eggs, 36 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 257, 264 (2002); see also Duke Fertility Services,
Medications: Lupron, DUKEHEALTH.ORG, http://www.dukehealth.org/Services/
Fertility/Resources/Medications/Lupron (last visited Oct. 25, 2007) (describing
Lupron as effectively turning one's ovaries off so that the physician can "control
the amount of ovarian stimulation by the amount of medication").
56 See Egg Donation Inc., Donor Info, http://www.eggdonor.com/?section
=donor&page=process (last visited Mar. 15, 2007) [hereinafter EggDonor.com]
("Once the doctor has synchronized the cycles, you will begin receiving daily in-
jections of Gonal-f, Fertinex or Follistim to stimulate your ovaries. Ultrasound ex-
aminations are then used to evaluate your ovaries' response to the stimulation
treatment and blood tests performed to monitor your estradiol level.").
57 See, e.g., Christy Oglesby, Egg Donation Long, Hard Process, CNN.coM, July
31, 2001, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/HEALTH/parenting/07/
13/egg.donation/index.html (explaining that human chorionic gonadotropin is a
hormone that triggers ovulation); Georgia Reproductive Specialists, In Vitro Fer-
tilization (IVF-ET), http://www.ivf.com/ivffaq.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2007)
(describing the in vitro fertilization process).
58 EggDonor.com, supra note 56.
59 See Shanley, supra note 55.
60 Univ. of Kentucky, First Baby Delivered from Commercial Frozen Donor Egg
Bank, LAB L. WKLY., Jan. 27, 2006, at 249 (reporting on the ground breaking birth of
Avery Lee).
61 See Mayumi Saito, Here Comes the Egg Biz: Ova Operations Open in Japan,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_mNTN/is_44/ai108881982 (last visited
Oct. 25, 2007) (reporting that in 2003, a newly opened branch of a South Korean
ovam bank in Tokyo would arrange for recipients to browse the egg provider pro-
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for eggs has lagged behind that for sperm.62 The developmental
stages of the oocytes 63 into ova vary and oocytes are far more sensi-
tive to the "multiple steps involved in the cryopreservation proce-
dure, such as CPA [cryoprotectant agent] addition/removal, cool-
ing, and warming." 64 Oocytes are susceptible to osmotic and ionic
stress damage resulting from the cryoprotectant agent's permea-
tion through their membrane, and to aneuploidy 65 resulting from
exposure to low temperature.66 The new technology that enabled
the birth of Avery Lee on December 31, 2005,67 involves use of a
"more rapid freezing technique... in which the water in the egg is
replaced with a cryo-protectant that prevents egg damage."
68
Nonetheless, the high water content in the mature cells - the
eggs- makes "freezing and thawing them a delicate procedure that
has a [mere] 20 percent chance of success."69 This low rate of suc-
cess explains why many middleman clinics currently bypass the
cryopreservation phase, and merely arrange the transaction be-
tween the ova provider and recipient.
70
files, and even meet up to two providers "in person before making a final choice"
to undergo the medical procedure).
62 See id. (reporting that in 2003, "freezing human eggs for clinical applica-
tions [was] premature" due to a lack of safe methods).
63 The distinction between oocytes and ova is that the former are immature
egg cells that mature into the latter. Critser et al., supra note 32, at 149-51.
64 Id. Further sensitivity may stem from the hormonal treatments (e.g., Lu-
pron, which is a gonadoropin-releasing hormone agonist) which influence the de-
velopment of the germinal vesicle (fully grown) oocytes. Germinal vesicle oocytes
are particularly sensitive because maturation causes the germinal vesicle to break
down and "meiotic spindles [to] form in the cytoplasm, which makes them more
vulnerable to the detrimental effects of cryopreservation processing." Id.
65 Aneuploidy is a condition in which the number of chromosomes is abnor-
mal due to extra or missing chromosomes; this may lead to chromosomal genetic
disorders including Down syndrome and Turner syndrome. See Ulrich Melcher,
Aneuploidy, in MOLECULAR GENETICS 1211, 1211 (2003), http://opbs.okstate.edu/
%7Emelcher/MG/MGW1/MG1211.html (explaining that human genetic diseases
may result from trisomy or monosomy, with Down syndrome being a prominent
example of the former).
66 Critser et al., supra note 32, at 149-51. See also Michael J. Tucker, Human
Oocyte and Embryo Cryopreservation, IVF.coM http://www.ivf.com/boston.html
(describing the general concern over increased aneuploidy potential due to freez-
ing and thawing process of mature oocytes).
67 Univ. of Kentucky, supra note 60.
68 Id.
69 Dahleen Glanton, Women Put Pregnancy Hopes on Ice, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15,
2007, at 1.
70 See EggDonor.com, supra note 56 ("Once your Application has been ap-
proved, you will be entered into our egg donor database and available to be
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As advances in cryopreservation technology make the retrieve-
freeze-thaw procedure more viable for commercial ova banking, it
is inevitable that ova providers will be subjected to information
practices similar to those in sperm banking. Similar to sperm pro-
viders, ova provider applicants already have to provide informa-
tion on their family history, medical history (including child bear-
ing history), sexual activity, drug and medication usage,
educational background, philosophy on life, and any special char-
acteristics. 71 Their profiles, along with photographs, are also up-
loaded to a database that consumers may browse.72 Additionally,
ova providers are prescreened to ensure that age restrictions are
met73 and are subject to assessment by a professional with regard
to their psychological and medical suitability. With an increasing
chance of successful conception using cryogenically frozen eggs,
middleman clinics are increasingly storing the actual genetic in-
formation itself (contained in the gametes) in tandem with the per-
sonal information of the ova providers.74
3.2. The International Gametes Market, Information Transactions, and
Regulation
3.2.1. Overview of the International Gametes Market
Sperm and ova banks are the antithesis of barber shops75 in that
matched with a Recipient. Interested Recipients will then notify us of their inter-
est in you. We will provide you general non-identifying information about the
Recipient so you can decide if you wish to proceed. If you are desirous of work-
ing with the Recipient, you will receive a contract from the Recipient's attorney
and you will be required to schedule an independent legal consultation with an
attorney of your choice. Your Recipient Couple will contribute $300 towards the
cost of this consultation.")
71 Advanced college degrees such as master's or doctorate degrees, Asian and
Jewish ancestry, career-oriented professionals, and unique artistic or creative tal-
ents comprise special characteristics. Egg Donation Inc., Donor Info, http://www
.eggdonor.com/?section=donor&page=dfaq (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
72 The Donor Egg Bank Inc., Application, http://www.donoreggbankinc
.com/application.php (requesting a recent digital photograph as part of the appli-
cation) (last visited Oct. 25, 2007); see e.g., The Donor Egg Bank Inc., Donor Profile
Information, http://www.donoreggbankinc.com/850105.html (featuring a cur-
rent photograph of an egg provider replete with detailed post-secondary educa-
tion and career information) (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
73 EggDonor.com, supra note 56 (justifying the restriction on adult status to
ages between 21-30 and time of optimal biological condition).
74 Id.
75 In literature on globalization, barbers are a popular example of service
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the customer bases need not be tied to the physical location of the
headquarters or labs. While many middlemen operate labs or clin-
ics in different states or countries, 76 most banks will ship cryopre-
served sperm in special vials packed in liquid nitrogen77 to mailing
addresses around the world.78
Despite the fragility of ova in relation to the cryopreservation
storage process, international 'mail-order' egg donation also exists.
Dr. B.C. Heng reports that scarcity of egg providers in developed
countries has prompted "some fertility clinics... to source oocyte
providers tied to a physical location. Put differently, barber shops are necessarily
local: since few people would find it cost-effective to fly to another country for a
haircut since the cost of the flight would be greater than any savings from wage
differentials. See, e.g., CHARLES DERBER, PEOPLE BEFORE PROFIT: THE NEW
GLOBALIZATION IN AN AGE OF TERROR, BIG MONEY, AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 139 (2002)
(noting the local and small-scale characteristics of barber shops).
76 For instance, Los Angeles-based Cryobank maintains a laboratory branch
in Cambridge, Massachusetts and an international affiliate in Frederiksberg,
Denmark. California Cryobank Sperm Bank-Locations, http://www.cryobank
.com/fact2.cfm?page=2&sub=2 (last visited Dec. 7, 2007). Georgia-based Xytex
Corp. operates several satellite offices in the United States and Canada, as well as
a Swiss affiliate. Xytex Corporation, About Us, http://www.xytex.com/
aboutus.cfm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
77 The "Frequently Asked Questions" page on Xytex's website explains:
Each unit of semen arrives frozen in a screw-cap vial. Each vial is clipped
to a metal support rod (called a "cane") to facilitate vial removal from a
refrigerated "tank" (or "dry shipper"). The tank is refrigerated with liq-
uid nitrogen trapped in spongy material to prevent spillage, hence the
name "dry shipper." Outside of the tank are shipping documents includ-
ing product description and other non-frozen material such as insemina-
tion appliances, "Summary of Records" and a packet of documents for
the inseminated patient.
Xytex, Patient Section FAQ, http://www.xytex.com/patient-faq.cfm#44 (last vis-
ited Dec. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Xytex Patient Page].
See also Cryos New York, Ordering & Shipping, http://www.scandinavian
cryobank.com/orders.aspx (last visited Dec. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Cryos Orders]
(explaining that semen is shipped in its own "high security" straws, with ID tags
via FedEx in "aluminum-clad liquid nitrogen-filled shipping flask[s] chilled to
minus 320 degrees Fahrenheit").
78 While some banks will ship the sperm specimen directly to the customer,
others will only ship to people or places with medical authority, such as a physi-
cian, authorized medical staff, or institutions approved for therapeutic treatment
with donor semen. Compare California Cryobank Sperm Bank -Reproductive
FAQs, http://www.cryobank.com/reprofq.cfm?page=5 (last visited Dec. 7, 2007)
("The specimens are guaranteed in the dry shipper tanks for 7 days from the date
shipped.") and Xytex Patient Page, supra note 77 (" [Slhipments will only be sent to
your medical specialist who has signed a Supply Agreement with Xytex").
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donors from poorer countries .... "79 To avoid efficiency problems
arising from the low survivability of cyropreserved and thawed
oocytes, these middlemen ship the frozen sperm of the recipient's
male partner abroad through courier mail to the foreign clinic.
80
After fertilizing the eggs, the foreign clinic then ships cryopre-
served embryos back to the recipient for transplant.81
Moreover, many banks operate thriving web-based "store-
fronts" on the Internet by selling subscription access to a protected
electronic database of sperm provider profiles.82 The websites also
list the rates charged per shipment of a particular "grade" of
treated sperm.83 After submitting an "Authorization for Release of
Semen" form or an equivalent signed notice, which indicates that
the consumer is receiving care under the supervision of a physi-
cian, consumers may complete either an electronic or hardcopy or-
der form for a particular sperm provider's specimen. The "mail-
order" sperm business often crosses international borders. Danish
sperm bank giant Cryos, for instance, provides semen for artificial
insemination treatment in as many as sixty countries, 84 including
Spain, Paraguay, Kenya, Hong Kong and the United States.85
Operating a virtual storefront makes economic sense to the
middleman, because the service -access and use of genetic infor-
mation of individuals with particular physical, social, and personal
attributes (and experiences) - is a niche one. Consumers are very
selective in designing the genetic makeup of their offspring, be-
cause they want to maximize the likelihood that their offspring will
79 BC Heng, The Advent of International 'Mail-Order' Egg Donation, BJOG, AN
INT'L J. OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNAECOLOGY 1225, 1225 (2006).
80 Id. ("[Firozen sperm of the recipient's male partner is exported abroad
through courier mail").
81 Id.
82 See e.g., Xytex, Sample Donor Profile. http://www.xytex.com/patient
_sdp.cfm (last visited Dec. 7, 2007) (providing a sample profile that shows what
information is contained in a donor profile).
83 See e.g., Xytex, Patient Section. http://www.xytex.com/patientjfees.cfm
(last visited Dec. 7, 2007) (listing the prices for different categories of semen and
shipping methods).
84 Denmark to Tax Insemination Clinic Donors, PLAYFULS.COM, Jan. 12, 2007, at
http://www.playfuls.com/news_003921_DenmarkToTaxInseminationClinic
_Donors.html.
85 Lizette Alvarez, Spreading Scandinavian Genes, Without Viking Boats, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at A4 (listing possible destinations for deposited sperm and
indicating that sperm banks may establish new satellite offices in places where its
Internet mail-order business demonstrates a sufficient demand in that area).
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identify with them and their existing or ideal partners.86 Shared
ancestry or heritage, similarity of physical features, and common
personality traits strengthen the relationships that consumers have
with their offspring.87 As consumer preferences for access and use
of genetic information in perpetuating their progeny vary with in-
dividual taste, the success of the web-based fertility business is
vested in its ability to address on a global scale the scarcity of gam-
ete providers that meet consumer demand.88 In other words,
blonde-haired, blue-eyed sperm providers with doctorates in as-
trophysics and who speak at least one Scandinavian language may
be scarce in Japan but are likely available in Denmark.
3.2.2. International Markets as a Function of Regional Regulatory
Landscapes Over Information Disclosure in Britain,
Denmark, and the United States
Local regulations, ranging from laws mandating disclosure of
the identity of sperm or ova providers8 9 to outright bans on gamete
transfers, 90 also contribute to the scarcity of supply.91 Regulation-
86 Although critics warn of designer babies and eugenics, Cryos Managing
Director Ole Schou insists that the real impetus is that people want "someone like
them, someone they can relate to." Id. See also Caballero, supra note 14 (reporting
an increasing demand for 'designer babies:' the consumer decides which eggs to
purchase based on SAT scores and other desired characteristics).
87 Stoler's interview with California CryoBank's founder reveals the prefer-
ences consumers have for similar ancestry: "Italian women, sometimes they only
want full-blooded Italians." Stoler himself was valued for his Jewish ancestry,
which led him to quip that "Jewish women are hard-pressed to find the seeded
rye." Stoler, supra note 42.
88 Certain attributes, such as blonde hair and blue eyes, tend to be more
popular than others. In 2005, the FDA banned "sperm from any European coun-
tries with exposure to mad cow disease" causing U.S. sperm banks to "run[] low
on donor sperm that can produce... Scandinavian babies." Mad Cow Ban Leads to
U.S. Shortage of 'European' Sperm, THE CANADIAN PRESS, Sept. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.cbc.ca/story/health/national/2007/09/21/sperm-shortage.html
[hereinafter Mad Cow Ban].
89 See e.g., Kerry Howley, A Market in Morals, THE AMERICAN, Jan. 26, 2007,
http://www.american.com/archive/2007/january-0107/a-market-in-morals
(noting that when Britain banned anonymous selling of sperm, supply dramati-
cally decreased); see also Bill Muelenberg, Sperm Wars, CULTURE WATCH, Nov. 6,
2007, http://www.billmuehlenberg.com/2007/06/11/sperm-wars (explaining
that some countries have banned the anonymous sale of sperm by requiring that
donors must consent to being identified to the children resulting from the dona-
tion once the children reach the age of eighteen).
90 Switzerland's constitution prohibits all commercial transactions that impli-
cate human germinal material. Constitution fsdrale de la Conf~dration suisse
[Constitution] April 18, 1999, SR 101, RO 101, art. 119(2)(e) (Switz.), available at
2007]
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imposed scarcity creates opportunity for enterprising middlemen
to respond to the surplus demand by facilitating cross-border
transactions.92 Cryos, for instance, has sold sperm to Italy93 and
http://www.adnin.ch/suchen/index.html?keywords=119&lang=en. Australia's
Prohibition of Human Cloning Act likewise targets the exchange of gametes for
any consideration. L. Bernier & D. Grgoire, Reproductive and Therapeutic Clon-
ing, Germline Therapy, and Purchase of Gametes and Embryos: Comments on
Canadian Legislation Governing Reproduction Technologies, 30 J. MED. ETHICS
527, 530 (2004) ("[S]ection 23... states that it is an offence to intentionally give or
receive value for the supply of human eggs, sperm, or embryos."). Sweden's
Transplantation Act expressly precludes the operation of sperm and ova brokers
by providing "that someone who wilfully [sic] and for profit, collects, donates,
receives or acts as an intermediary in respect to biological material from a living
or a dead human.., shall be fined or sentenced to imprisonment for up to 2
years." Id. "In Norway sperm donation is legal, but egg donation is not- despite
today's technology and medical techniques that make it possible." BERET BRATEN,
KILDEN INFORMATION CENTRE FOR GENDER RESEARCH IN NORWAY, MOTHERHOOD
CHALLENGED (2006), http://kilden.forskningsradet.no/c17224/artikkel/vis.htnl
?tid=41266.
91 See e.g., Sperm Ships for Fertility Seekers, BBC NEWS, Sept. 16, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4251634.stm [hereinafter Sperm Ships] (quot-
ing Ole Schou of Cryos as saying, "[i]f you have different regulations on treat-
ments[of gamete transfers,] then you will have trading across borders."). Even
regulation not intended to target the human reproductive technology industry can
create scarcity of gametes. The FDA's prohibition of the importation of sperm
from countries with mad cow disease is one such example. See e.g., Mad Cow Ban,
supra note 88 (reporting criticism of the ban on the grounds that the human form
of mad cow disease - Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease - has never been documented as
being "passed on after a sperm donation"); Steven Kotler, The God of Sperm, LA
WEEKLY, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.laweekly.com/news/news/the-god-of
-sperm/17290/?page=1 (reporting that Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease is a prion dis-
ease and cannot be sexually transmitted, and that the only danger would come
from someone actually eating mad cow-tainted frozen sperm).
92 According to Professor Debora Spar, sperm and ova brokers "capitalize on
regulatory gaps. In Germany, all eggs removed from a woman must be trans-
ferred back inside her [since egg transfer of any sort is illegal]: But in Russia, these
same eggs can be sold or bartered." Caballero, supra note 14. After extensive me-
dia coverage about a Romanian clinic "specialising [sic] in egg cell donation to EU
nationals in return for financial compensation," the European Commission re-
leased a report in 2006 surveying the national legislations of 25 member states re-
lating to reproductive cell donation. Health & CONSUMER PROTECTION DIRECTOR-
ATE-GENERAL, REPORT ON THE REGULATION OF REPRODUCTIVE CELL DONATION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 2 (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/phjthreats/
human-substance/documents/tissuesfrep-en.pdf. While the European Com-
mission regards payment of substantial fees beyond compensation for expenses
and inconveniences related to the donation procedure to obtain human egg cells
"to be against the principles expressed in the Directive 2004/23/EC on Tissues &
Cells," the Directive also "provides for a mechanism that will allow for a coherent
approach to the authorisation of imports and exports [of gametes]." Id. at 2. This
has also opened the doors for creative gamete transfer arrangements, such as mo-
bile fertility clinics on ships which would be "governed by the laws of their own
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Middle Eastern countries where sperm donations are taboo.94
Similarly, the United Kingdom's prohibition on selling ova 95 has
generated an influx of British women contracting with middleman
gencies based in countries with a relatively laissez-faire attitude
towards domestic and international gamete transactions (such as
the United States).96 As the responsible regulatory authority in
Britain, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
("HFEA")97 limits the amount of compensation that British egg
providers may receive in the form of "reasonable expenses" in-
curred during the provision process. Compensation for opportu-
nity costs measured in lost earnings is also permitted: "you can
claim £55.19 for each full day up to a maximum of £250 per cycle of
egg donation or course of sperm donation."98 With reasonable ex-
country [thereby allowing] people from many different countries.., to sidestep
their own nation's fertility laws." Sperm Ships, supra note 91.
93 Italy's 2004 ban was prompted by the Roman Catholic Church's outcry
against playing God. See Andrew Wancata, Note, No Value for a Pound of Flesh:
Extending Market-Inalienability of the Human Body, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 227 (2003);
see also Caballero, supra note 14 ("Italy [has also] passed legislation that prohibits
sterile, gay, or single adults from using donor eggs or surrogate mothers.").
94 Alvarez, supra note 70. See also Marcia C. Inhorn, A More Open Mind To-
ward Iran, THE CHRONICLE REVIEW, June 23, 2006, http://www.chronicle.com/
weekly/v52/i42/42b01201.htm (comparing Sunni Muslim fatwas prohibiting any
form of third-party donation of gametes with Shiite cleric Ayatollah Ali Hussein
Khamanei's fatwa permitting both sperm and egg donation, the latter of which
has led to significant reproductive tourism in Tehran).
95 The 1990 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act prohibits any form of
consideration for the supply of gametes unless otherwise spe'ified in a direction
issued under section 23. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37,
art. 12(e) (U.K.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1990/ukpga
19900037_en 1#pb5-11g12. In 1996, a direction instructed that "individual donors
of gametes may be given money or other benefits for the supply of their gametes,"
although the value of the consideration is to be capped at £15. See Directions
Given Under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, Ref.D. 1996/1,
Feb. 22, 1996, available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/D-1996-1_Giving-and
_receivingmoney_or_other benefits.pdf (providing also that institutional suppli-
ers of gametes-the middle-men-may receive sufficient money to reimburse the
"supplier's reasonable expenses").
96 Jonathan Thompson & Renee Knight, Eggs for Sale: The Booming Business of
Sharing Your Fertility, THE INDEPENDENT, Nov. 5, 2006, http://news.independent
.co.uk/health/ article1956558.ece.
97 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), http://
www.hfea.gov.uk (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
98 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), FAQs for Donors,
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3F57D79B-63EEE067/hfea/hs.xsl/
1205.html#HowmuchdoI (last visited Dec. 7, 2007).
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penses reaching no more than £1,000, 99 compensation is well below
the going rate of $8,000 for "average" quality eggs in New York.100
It is unsurprising that women with highly desirable physical, per-
sonal and intellectual traits from the United Kingdom and other
countries with similar (or even more restrictive) bans on ova ex-
changes for monetary consideration 01 are vying to exchange their
gametes for $35,000-50,000 of compensation in the United States. 02
The U.S. egg business is worth an estimated $4.5 billion, making
America "a world centre for egg donation." 10 3
Government regulation has also contributed to the scarcity of
UK sperm providers. On April 1, 2005, a new regulation lifted do-
nor anonymity on the grounds that donor-conceived individuals
have a right to trace their genetic origins once they reach eighteen
years of age.10 4 Thus, sperm providers' identities are no longer
shielded by the HFEA as the national government registry will re-
lease a provider's identifying information upon the request of any-
one conceived with the provider's gametes.105 Lack of anonymity
99 See Sarah Boseley, Women May Get £1,000 for Their Eggs, THE GUARDIAN,
Nov. 12, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/medicine/story/0,11381,1349407,00
.html (noting the possibility of increased donor compensation following the pas-
sage of new regulations; amounting to approximately $1,973.75, at an exchange
rate of $1.00 for £0.506649).
100 Thompson & Knight, supra note 96 (noting the drastic upturn in egg prices
over the last fifteen years).
101 While eggs cannot technically be sold, compensation for "expenses in-
curred" is not capped and in fact acts as a proxy for the sale of the egg. Simply
put, ova providers charge what the market will bear for the time and effort ex-
pended in donating eggs -a calculus that includes the quality and conditioning of
their genetically linked attributes. For example, a university degree connotes in-
telligence and diligence.
102 See Thompson & Knight, supra note 96 (stating that American "[d]onors
with the right physical, personal and intellectual attributes can attract fees of up to
$35,000 for their eggs, with some in the industry claiming that as much as $50,000
has changed hands").
103 Id.
104 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), supra note 98
(stating that the information requirements became effective as of an April 1, 2005
change in the law).
105 Dr. Kirk Maxey summarizes the view of advocates for ending anonymity:
It's access to the information.... [a donor should know that his kids] ex-
ist and whether they are healthy or not. And that there is a meeting
point, an information exchange point where, if you want to know about
each other, you can go there. Becoming connected with your genetic
relatives should be facilitated and not blocked.
Martin Bashir, Confessions of a Sperm Donor, ABC NEWS, Aug. 31, 2006,
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is a huge disincentive for potential sperm providers because many
are concerned about the psychological impact of being contacted
by children conceived with their sperm.106 This regulation has
"decimated the ranks of men once willing to donate .... " 107 - a de-
velopment to which middleman clinics in countries with surpluses
of sperm have responded with semen imports and arrangements
for procreative or "fertility tourism."108
Cryos' web-based operations have permitted the Danish sperm
bank giant to increase its global market power by arranging trans-
actions to meet the disproportionate demand (for access to and use
of the genetic material and attached personal information). This
disproportionate demand is generated by a combination of the
idiosyncratic preferences of consumers and local laws. First, there
is generally high market demand for Scandinavian attributes: tall,
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/Health/Story?id=1982328&page=1; see also
Angus Roxburgh, Dutch Sperm Laws Threaten Donations, BBC NEws, Aug. 12, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3555202.stm (quoting one sperm donor as
saying, "I don't know how many children I have fathered, and don't want to
know. The right of the child is all very well, but so is the right of the donor .... ").
Advocates of lifting anonymity claim that the value of record-keeping and main-
taining a registry of gamete donors and recipients outweighs the costs. The claim
is that access to the medical and genetic information of their progenitors is vital
for children conceived with donor gametes who wish to assess their own repro-
ductive and health needs. See Nanette R. Elster, ARTistic Licence: Should Assisted
Reproductive Technologies Be Regulated?, in ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY:
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND NEW HORIZONS 366, 373 (Christopher J. De Jonge & Chris-
topher L. R. Barratt eds., 2002) (analogizing gamete donation to the adoption con-
text "where a range of non-identifying information must be collected and main-
tained and is accessible to the child when he or she reaches adulthood").
Furthermore, at a basic level, advocates of lifting anonymity root their claim in the
idea that children conceived with donor gametes should be able to exercise the
"right to know the identity of their biological fathers." Roxburgh, supra note 105.
106 See Alvarez, supra note 85 ("Faced with the possibility that 18 years down
the line, one, or perhaps 10 or 20, of their children can surprise them at the front
door, most young men opt out."). But see Elster, supra note 105, at 373 (describing
that while the number of donors initially declined after "Sweden enacted a law
requiring collection of donor information to be maintained for 70 years," the
number of donors returned to the previous level shortly thereafter).
107 Will Pavia, How Danish Sperm is Conquering the World, THE TIMES, Nov. 27,
2006, at 4 available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life.and-style/health/
features/article649651.ece.
108 An example of procreative travel or tourism is British women traveling to
Denmark to purchase sperm. According to Dr. Karstein Peterson of Ciconia Pri-
vate Hospital in Denmark, who has already treated 20 British couples, this is a
common occurrence: "It's all very recent, but many are e-mailing me. You can fly
Ryanair from Stansted, and we have deals with hotels: fertility tourists get a dis-
count." Id.
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blond hair and blue eyes.109 Secondly, the sexually liberal culture,
health care structure110 and laws protecting anonymity all support
a sperm provision regime. Third, while the sperm vault at Cryos
stores about 75,000 straws, Denmark is a small country where
"only 65,000 children are born each year."" 1 Denmark therefore
has a surplus of sperm for export.
Although Denmark may have cornered some markets for fro-
zen sperm," 2 Cryos has by no means ousted American players on
either the global scale or domestic turf. Unburdened by anonymity
regulations, U.S. sperm banks have thus far been "far more willing
than Cryos and other overseas counterparts to reveal information
about donors." 113 Middlemen such as Xytex and Cryobank offer
baby and adult photos, Keirsey Personality Test diagnoses, facial
feature reports, personal statements, descriptions of love-lives and
staff impressions as part of a premium version of the standard
provider or "donor" profile. Subscribers to the general database
may purchase access to these "add-ons" or extended profiles at
carte blanche or upgraded subscription package rates!' 4 Some
banks even offer audio interviews with the sperm provider." 5
109 See Alvarez, supra note 85 (noting that Cryos' above average pregnancy
rate of 12-31% is also a factor).
110 Male Danes receive a thorough sexual education at primary school, and
are given the "option of having their sperm tested" during a mandatory health
check required by the national conscription scheme. Sexual health awareness
coupled with a pro-donation attitude in blood makes sperm donation a natural
choice for many Danes. Pavia, supra note 107.
111 Id.
112 See Mark Tighe, Viking's Test Tube Invasion, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Dec. 3,
2006 (describing the dominance of Cryos in Ireland).
113 G. Pascal Zachary, A Most Unlikely Industry Finds It Can't Resist Globaliza-
tion's Call, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2000, at B1.
114 For example:
For $81, a consumer could... [purchase] a package that would provide
them with a photograph of the donor as an infant, a profile of more than
20 pages of information, an audio interview with the donor, a 10-page
report based on a Keirsey Temperament evaluation, sketches of the do-
nor's features, an essay written by the donor, and a document entitled
Staff Impressions in which members of the facility's staff offer their opin-
ions on the donor's personality.
Barney, supra note 11, at 212 (citation omitted).
115 See, e.g., Sperm Banking with Fairfax Cryobank, Sperm Donor Informa-
tion, http://www.fairfaxcryobank.com/donorinfo.aspx?menu=4&tum=on (last
visited Nov. 15, 2007) ("Also available on a majority of our donors, audio inter-
views provide insightful information into the donor's childhood, aspirations, ac-
complishments, values, family life, and personal interests in his own words.").
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While Cryos, since opening its New York office, has fleshed out its
donor profiles to include personal information on favorite animals,
colors, food and childhood memory, there are limits to the amount
of identifying information that the company can provide. For in-
stance, it is unlikely that a childhood photo or facial feature sketch,
let alone a current photo, will ever be permitted under Denmark's
anonymity laws.
The availability of upgraded access for purchase reflects con-
sumer thirst for information that helps them "establish 'an emo-
tional connection' to the donor 'to understand what he's like as a
person' and "divine the magical alchemy of genetics and person-
ality."" 6 It also underlines that the valuable and profitable service
that sperm (and ova) banks provide is access to that information.
3.3. Middlemen and the Regulatory Landscape in the United States
over their Practices and Procedures
3.3.1. Information Privacy Issues
There are two topical information privacy concerns in the
sperm and ova bank industry. The first one revolves around the
entrustment of a sperm or ova provider of his/her sensitive per-
sonal information to a middleman bank. Since the information
stored involves medical, genetic and personal information linked
to an individual, it is unsurprising that entrustment of personal in-
formation is a general concern of tissue banking. The 2003 bank-
ruptcy of Options National Fertility Registry, which left in limbo
eleven large storage cabinets filled with "potentially explosive"
highly sensitive files on providers and recipients, u 7 illustrates the
danger of relying on un-regulated middlemen to safeguard the in-
formation. That is, it illustrates the danger of what happens when
a middleman bank changes its policy on protecting the informa-
tion, sells the business or, as in the case of bankruptcy, is unable to
116 Tamara Audi, Sperm Buyers Customize Orders: Banks Offer Choices Down to
Minutest Detail, DET. FREE PRESS, May 22, 2006, at 1A, available at
http://www.wzzml3.com/news/watercooler/watercooler-article.aspx?storyid
=54856.
117 See Teri Sforza, Egg Donor Registry Records in Limbo, THE ORANGE COUNTY
REG., Oct. 7, 2007, available at http://www.ocregister.com/news/egg-donor
-children-1879669-donors-eggs (noting also that the "files in that nondescript stor-
age unit [currently paid for by the bankruptcy trustee through the middle of Oc-
tober] could unravel highly sensitive, and carefully-kept, family secrets.").
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continue protecting the information." 8 Since sperm and ova banks
are not physicians, they do not have any "medical or legal obliga-
tion to maintain these records," 19 which means that middlemen
are not subject to scrutiny for failure to protect the data privacy of
their providers. In sum:
[tihe concern is that, while such potentially sensitive infor-
mation is becoming increasingly easier to obtain, adequate
safeguards and procedures for handling this information
are not yet in place. Therefore, the current system for pro-
tecting tissue donors, which has worked well in the past, is
becoming and will continue to become increasingly obso-
lete. 20
Secondly, the global nature of sperm (and increasingly ova)
markets due to franchising or foreign affiliate partnerships
121
amongst the major middleman banks, and the operation of web
store fronts translates into cross-border information flows. Gamete
provider profiles contain substantial personal information, includ-
ing attributes that in the aggregate establish a link to the identity of
the provider. This information may be accessed by the public
upon remittance of a subscription fee or a pay-per-view charge. 22
118 Change of stewardship over the information can compromise the data
privacy of providers. Suppose the "highly sensitive records" are sold on eBay to
insurance companies or identity theft rings? Id. (reporting that a founder of an
online database of potential egg donors feels "obligated to contact... post-2004
clients at their last known address to inform them of the pending sale [of the
business]... [and give them] the choice of paying a service to hold the informa-
tion, or the information would most probably be destroyed.").
119 Id. (noting that bioethicist Arthur Caplan believes that gamete banks and
brokers should be accountable for all the records and that regulations "mandating
minimal requirements for egg banks and brokers, including bankruptcy and dis-
aster/catastrophe plans" should be implemented).
120 Ted T. Ashburn et al., Human Tissue Research in the Genomic Era of Medicine:
Balancing Individual and Societal Interests, 160 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 3377,
3378 (2000).
121 For instance, the Cryos International Sperm Bank Ltd. is the franchisor of
Cryos International - Denmark (offices in Aarhus, Copenhagen and Ordense) and
Cryos New York (previously Scandianvian Cryobank). See Cryos International,
Cryos' Franchise Concept, http://www.cryosinternational.com/franchise/cryos
-franchise-concept.aspx (last visited Dec. 7, 2007) ("Cryos International franchise
concept focuses on the establishment of sperm banks worldwide. Our goal is to
provide an extensive selection of high quality donor semen to patients and clinics
all over the world through our network of sperm banks.").
122 Like any online database, the database of donor profiles, even if en-
crypted, is susceptible to security breaches by careless employees or malicious
[Vol. 29:2550
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Genetic information, encapsulated in frozen reproductive cells, is
also physically sent to consumers (or their medical providers) who
are often in foreign countries. The concern over the flow of such
cross-border information stems from the varying data protection
standards of different countries. Information transferred abroad is
only protected so far as provided by contractual terms, and to the
extent that these terms will be enforced by regulatory and en-
forcement authorities in the destination country. Thus, when a po-
tential customer in a country with weaker information protection
laws purchases access to the gamete provider profile, and then
purchases the provider's actual genetic information by way of the
gamete, there are concerns that the provider's information may be
abused. 123 The protection over the gamete provider's information
privacy may be diluted as the information is transmitted to a
weaker information protection regime.
It is in the middleman's commercial interest to protect the data
privacy of the sperm and ova providers--that is, the information
suppliers-because the providers will only contract with banks
that they trust.124 Xytex's statement on its donor website highlights
the sensitivity of this relationship:
Reproduction is a very personal matter and we respect your
desire for privacy. The information you share with us is
held in strictest confidence, unavailable to anyone other
than your health care professionals without your express
hackers. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Dec. 7,
2007) (tracking incidents of electronic data breaches since 2005 ranging from uni-
versity files to health records). Middle-men databases of the providers contain an
even greater wealth of sensitive personal information-medical information,
physical attributes, personality information, and sometimes even the names and
contact details of providers "open" to disclosing their identities. There is certainly
an incentive for hackers to breach the electronic database and make a windfall by
selling data packages on the providers.
123 Abuse occurs when someone other than the designated recipient gains ac-
cess to the provider's information. For instance, if sperm provider Z contracts
with the sperm bank to supply his personal information for the sole purpose of
facilitating the transaction of his genetic material for conception, and researchers
for a biotech company somehow gain database access to Z's information, Z's in-
formation privacy--his ability to control who has access to and use of his personal
information--has been violated.
124 Sperm banks do, however, traditionally destroy records of the provider
after his samples are sold, in order to preserve anonymity. Kotler, supra note 91
(noting that California Cryobank reacted to media reports of children trying to
track their biological fathers by removing information from donor profiles).
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permission. Your information will not be shared or sold to
any other company or institution. Likewise, Xytex respects
donor privacy and releases information about the donors
only with the donor's permission. Encryption of your fi-
nancial information is provided .... 125
However, while some banks and gamete providers enter into
contracts with confidentiality and privacy clauses, the lack of com-
prehensive and general information privacy laws in the U.S. means
that the standards of information protection and terms of liability
will fluctuate from middleman to middleman.
126
3.3.2. Formal Regulations in the United States Affecting Sperm
and Ova Banks - HIPAA and FDA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
("HIPAA")127 Privacy Rule128 expressly covers personal health in-
formation and access to medical records. HIPAA "requires disclo-
sures only to the individual.., and to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services for the purpose of enforcement" 129 and mandates
that "covered entities" appoint a Privacy Officer in charge of re-
sponding to complaints, notifying individuals of uses of their per-
sonal health information, track disclosures, and document privacy
policies and procedures.l3 a HIPAA's protection' 3' of the privacy of
125 Xytex Patient Page, supra note 77.
126 In the contract for provision of personal information and gametes, the
banks are the sophisticated parties. Sperm and ova providers sign boilerplate in-
formation release forms so that any arms-length negotiation that occurs tends to
revolve around the value of special or highly desirable traits of the provider. Kot-
ler, supra note 91 (reporting that Northwest Andrology has requested at least one
provider to remove his information from a sibling donor registry site as part of his
contract).
127 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
128 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45
C.F.R. § 164 (2007), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/combinedregtext.pdf.
129 ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY & HUMAN RIGHTS 2005: AN
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF PRIVACY LAWS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1067 (2006).
130 Id. at 1068.
131 The Privacy Rule sports civil penalties for noncompliance and criminal
penalties for malicious misappropriation and misuse of health information, which
are enforced by the Department of Health and Human Services' Office for Civil
Rights and the Department of Justice, respectively. Id. at 1068. The Privacy Rule
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medical information does not apply beyond the "covered enti-
ties."132
While middleman banks do electronically transmit health in-
formation in connection with certain transactions, it is not fully
clear whether middleman banks constitute "health care provid-
ers" 133 or "health care clearinghouses" within the definition of
"covered entities."134 Middleman banks differ from such institu-
tional and non-institutional providers of medical services as hospi-
tals and dentists respectively. 135 Sperm and ova banks are only
health care providers if the services they offer--access to and use
of genetic information from human sources of particular attrib-
utes-constitute "furnishing health care." Alternately, while mid-
dleman banks do receive and process non-standard information
from the gamete providers, their business does not resemble the
traditional "health care clearinghouses" which offer "billing ser-
vices, repricing companies, community health management infor-
mation systems, and value-added networks and switches if these
entities perform clearinghouse functions." 136 Even if gamete banks
were "covered entities" and subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the
scope of protection would be inadequate. The HIPAA Privacy
Rule does not cover non-medical or non-health information,137
does not preempt state laws providing stronger protection for health and medical
information. Id. at 1067.
132 See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Covered Entity Charts,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HIPAAGenInfo/Downloads/CoveredEntitycharts.pdf
(defining an entity that furnishes, bills or receives payment for health care in the
normal course of business and electronically transmits covered transactions as a
covered entity) [hereinafter HIPAA Covered Entity].
133 But see Johnson v. Cal. Cryobank, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 655 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that a sperm bank constitutes a 'health care provider' under the
State Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13(a)). This case adheres to the state's
civil procedure definition of 'health care provider' and thus may be discounted in
relevance to the HIPAA definition.
134 HIPAA Covered Entity, supra note 132.
135 29 C.F.R. § 825.118 (2007) defines the following as health care providers:
medical or osteopathic doctors, podiatrists, dentists, nurse practitioners, clinical
psychologists, and "any health care provider from whom an employer or the em-
ployer's group health plan's benefits manager will accept certification of the exis-
tence of a serious health condition to substantiate a claim for benefits .... Since
the banks merely provide brokering services-transactions in information--and
do not perform the clinical procedures themselves, they are arguably not "health
care providers" under the purview of 29 CFR § 825.118.
136 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE 3 (2003) available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacysummary.pdf.
137 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2007).
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which leaves much of the remaining identifying information in the
gamete provider profile unprotected.
Since 2005, the procedures and practices of sperm and ova
banks have been governed by the Food and Drug Administration's
("FDA") general regulations on tissue banking. The regulations
were intended to address concerns over ineffective screening pro-
cedures that either gave rise to recipients infected by the diseased
sperm or their children conceived with genetic defects due to the
diseased sperm. 138 The rule139 focuses on "donor screening, quality
processing, and record keeping, [with the] ... goal [of] keep[ing]
infectious tissue out of circulation." 140
21 C.F.R. § 1271,141 which applies to human cells, tissues, and
cellular and tissue-based products, in effect creates a mandatory
tissue bank registry that includes sperm and ova banks, proscribes
a uniform and authoritative standard for donor screening, and
grants the FDA inspection and enforcement rights over the screen-
ing and testing processes and standard operating procedures used
by middlemen. 42 However, the regulations are unlikely to trans-
late into strict FDA oversight of the specific commercial activities
of sperm and ova banks beyond egregious practices that disregard
138 One prominent case involved Cryobank. After conceiving a child with
autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease using sperm from Cryobank, re-
cipient couple sued Cryobank for professional negligence, fraud and breach of
contract. Alleging that Cryobank knew of donor's family history of kidney dis-
ease, recipients claimed that Cryobank had failed to ascertain whether the donor
'was a potential carrier of the ADPKD gene, failed to property investigate [his]
family history of kidney disease, and falsely represented to the [recipient couple]
that the sperm they were purchasing had been tested and screened for infectious
and 'reasonably detectable genetically transferred' diseases .. " Johnson, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 654.
139 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1 (2007) requires manufacturers of human cellular and
tissue-based products to screen and test cell and tissue donors, in a way that "pre-
vents the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases.
available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/rules/frtisreg011901.pdf
140 Jeffrey Prottas, Ethics of Allocation: Lessons from Organ Procurement History,
in TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISsUE 120, 130 (Stuart J. Youngner et al., eds., Oxford
University Press 2004).
141 21 C.F.R. § 1271.
142 If the agency determines a bank is violating the rule, it may undertake
such enforcement actions as confiscating and destroying the violative tissue/cells,
ordering the bank to cease all operations, and engage in prosecution or fines. See
Martha A. Wells, Ctr. for Biologics Evaluation & Research, Presentation at the
AATB Annual Meeting, FDA Update: Regulation of Reproductive Establishments
(Sept. 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/tissue/aatb090906mw.pdf.
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health and safety factors.1 43 Information protection provisions are
conspicuously absent in the agency-promulgated standards for
donor screening.
3.3.3. Self-regulation
Some middleman banks, including Cryobank, have opted to
join professional organizations such as the American Association
of Tissue Banks ("AATB"). The ATTB confers accreditation for re-
trieval, processing, storage, and distribution of tissues to members
who submit to a "rigorous inspection of their operations" for com-
pliance to the AATB's Standards for Tissue Banking. 44 However,
much like the FDA regulations, the AATB Standards' singular fo-
cus is on good technical practices, as well as disease detection, pre-
vention, and control. 145 Information privacy protection is not ad-
dressed.
4. AN INFORMATION PRIVACY REGULATORY APPROACH-
REGULATE THE MIDDLEMAN IN THE GAMETES MARKET
Existing concerns over unauthorized access and use of sensitive
personal information of gamete providers would be mitigated by
an international standard mandating that sperm and ova banks
and brokers undertake certain safeguards in collecting, using and
disposing the information. The standard would also ideally hold
gamete banks and brokers legally accountable to the provider in
the event of a data privacy breach. It is extremely unlikely, how-
ever, that an international standard of any form will be promul-
gated, because to do so would force member states (of the interna-
tional body promulgating the standard)146 to recognize the gametes
143 Barney, supra note 11, at 211.
144 American Association of Tissue Banks, AATB Accreditation Process
Overview, http://aatb.timberlakepublishing.com/files/aatbaccreditationprocess
.pdf (Jan. 12, 2007).
145 See id. at 2 ("[T]he AATB inspection is not meant to be, nor is it, a surro-
gate inspection for an FDA inspection. The accreditation program is meant to as-
certain if good faith efforts are being made by the bank to comply with AATB
Standards and that the bank has a self-assessment mechanism and corrective and
preventive action procedures in place that will enable the bank to correct deficien-
cies.").
146 The World Trade Organization is one international authority that can ad-
dress the issue of gamete transactions. See Alice J. Carson, Trade in Reproductive
Human Biota: Our Quest for Babies, TED CASE STUDY TEMPLATE, Fall 2003,
http://www.american.edu/TED/reproductive-trade.htm (explaining that within
the WTO framework, the TRIPS agreement addressing public health, the
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market as a legitimate one.147 Even if gamete middleman suppliers
are narrowly construed as merely selling brokering services, the
discomfort of countries such as Germany towards any type of
gamete exchange makes it unlikely that they will support a stan-
dard regulating even the intermediaries that facilitate such ex-
changes. 148 Given the poor prospects for an international regula-
tory standard safeguarding the personal information of gamete
providers from any country, we should at least strive to protect the
data privacy of those gamete providers from the United States. A
binding national standard is necessary to ensure that sperm and
ova banks maintain practices that vigorously protect the informa-
tion privacy of their suppliers on a global scale. The FDA, as the
sole authority with enforcement capabilities in the human tissue
banking industry, is the appropriate agency to promulgate a new
mandatory standard for middlemen in the reproductive tissue
business. This new standard should comprise of data protection
principles that fully vest the gatekeeping powers in the hands of
the individual gamete provider. As the first internationally de-
rived set of information protection principles "intended to offer
Women's Global Network for Reproductive Rights, and the Dispute Settlement
Body's 2003 case regarding pig semen would support multinational regulation of
the compensation of gametes and reproductive trade generally). Carson also sug-
gests that the legal framework of the United Nations could support regulation
over gamete transactions as well by listing the UN Ban on Cloning, Convention
on the Rights of the Child, and Women Watch. Id. But see ALEXANDER MCCALL
SMITH & MICHEL REVEL, UNESCO, THE USE OF EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS IN
THERAPEUTIC RESEARCH: REPORT OF THE IBC ON THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH 12 (2001), available at http://portal.unesco.org/
shs/en/ files/2144/105413123llStemCellsen.pdf/StemCellsen.pdf (stating that
the transfer of human embryos can never be a commercial transaction and that
measures should be taken to discourage any financial incentive).
147 Countries prohibiting commercial and/or non-commercial gamete trans-
actions for various cultural, religious and historic reasons will refuse to recognize
or endorse such a standard even if their own laws make it a practical insignifi-
cance. See Buying Babies, supra note 39 (explaining that governments want to regu-
late the reproductive industry because the "manufacturing of anything which is
regarded as God-given - or at least natural - touches a moral nerve" and that such
regulations vary in conjunction with attitudes to the family). Even the United
States, as one of the largest markets, is unlikely to subscribe to such a standard if it
means formally acknowledging that a gametes market exists, because "[s]trictly
speaking, paying for donated eggs is illegal in America too, since it counts as buy-
ing a body part." Id. at 118. In other words, the gamete trade is conceptually ac-
ceptable to legislators only if consideration is construed as compensation for do-
nor time and effort rather than the gamete itself.
148 Germany has a flat-out ban on any form of egg transfers because it is "still
haunted by the memory of Nazi experiments." Caballero, supra note 14.
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harmonized protection of individual privacy rights while being
flexible enough to apply across a variety of social, legal, and eco-
nomic circumstances," 149 the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development Privacy Guidelines 50 ("OECD Privacy
Guidelines") encapsulates eight such data protection principles.
In the sperm and ova banking context, the gamete providers
are the "data subjects" and the middleman clinics are the "data
controllers." Principles 2 through 5 function to protect against
misuse or abuse of the control the gamete provider contractually
yields to the middleman. Principle 7 recognizes that the gamete
149 GLOBAL INTERNET POLICY INITIATIVE, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
FRAMEWORK FOR DATA PROTECTION AND ITS TRANSPOSITION TO DEVELOPING AND
TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES 1-2 (2004), available at http://www.internetpolicy.net/
privacy/20041228privacy.pdf [hereinafter "GLOBAL INTERNET"].
150 OECD Privacy Guidelines consist of:
1) Collection Limitation: there should be limits to the collection of per-
sonal data, and any such data collected ought to be obtained with the
consent of the data subject and in a lawful manner;
2) Data Quality: collected data should be relevant to a specific purpose,
and be accurate, complete, and up-to-date;
3) Purpose Specification: the purpose for collecting the data should be
communicated at the outset so that only new purposes that are compati-
ble with the original ones can be introduced, and data that no longer
serves a purpose should be destroyed or anonymized;
4) Use Limitation: data acquired for one purpose should only be used for
the specified purposes unless otherwise legally required or the data sub-
ject's consent is obtained;
5) Security Safeguards: data must be collected and stored so that it is rea-
sonably guarded from loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification or disclosure;
6) Openness: there should be general policy of transparency vis-a-vis de-
velopments, practices and policies with respect to the data, and data sub-
jects should have the means to confirm the existence and status of their
information, as well as the contact information of the data controller;
7) Individual Participation: data subjects should have the right to access,
confirm and demand correction of their personal information, and;
8) Accountability: the data controller assumes responsibility for comply-
ing with the aforementioned principles.
Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines on the Protection of
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provider ultimately retains full power of his gatekeeping role (with
respect to granting others access to his personal information) de-
spite contractually delegating aspects of that role to the bank.
Principle 1, in conjunction with Principle 6, sets the foundation for
gamete providers to enter into arms-length negotiations with the
middleman as to the nature and scope of the information (and ac-
cess thereto) to be transacted in. Principle 8 supports the imposi-
tion of liability on the sperm and ova banks should they fail to
adequately protect against un-consented access or use of the gam-
ete provider's information in the normal course of their operations.
In more concrete terms, the FDA should promulgate a standard
with the following information protection rules:
1) Sperm and ova banks shall collect no more non-
essential information (i.e., non-medical) than what
the gamete provider is willing to provide; however
the "purchase price" (compensation value) may re-
flect the amount of personally identifiable informa-
tion the provider wishes to reveal;
2) Should the gamete provider wish to update her
profile with non-trivial developments such as
pregnancy, or a recent change in a family member's
medical condition (i.e., grandparent recently diag-
nosed with Alzheimer's), the sperm and ova banks
shall accordingly adjust the provider's profile in a
timely fashion;
3) Sperm and ova banks that market to or conduct
business with citizens in foreign countries will un-
dertake measures to ensure that access to and/or
use of the provider's personal and genetic informa-
tion remains strongly protected,
Banks should observe the following guidelines:
1) Give notice to the gamete providers each time a
foreign recipient-customer expresses interest in ac-
cessing and using their particular information (ge-
netic information and any additional personal in-
formation such as audio interview), and;
2) Inform the gamete providers of the procedures
that will be undertaken to guarantee that their in-
formation privacy will not be compromised during
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or as a result of the cross-border transfer of the in-
formation.
3) Information in electronic databases should be
encrypted and the access protected from unauthor-
ized access (i.e., non-subscribers) with up-to-date
authentication technology;
4) Sperm and ova banks will be legally and finan-
cially liable for misuse, misappropriation, or abuse
of provider information (intrusions into the pro-
vider's information privacy) if reasonable steps
were not taken to prevent the circumvention of
protective measures.
5) Sperm and ova banks may not contract out of
their liability for failing to undertake reasonable
steps to protect the information privacy of their
providers.
The FDA should initiate an official accreditation process vis-A-
vis compliance with the above standard, and closely monitor the
operations as well as the information contracts that providers enter
into with banks. Banks that fail periodic inspections by the agency
will lose their accreditation and be subject to fines and orders to
cease operation. This solution places a premium on protecting in-
formation privacy without chilling the comparative advantage
middlemen in the United States currently enjoy: the freedom to
contract for access to various levels of personally identifiable in-
formation. If a gamete provider wishes to provide less informa-
tion, he will contract for more anonymity. 51 It is possible that one
market effect of this regulation may be a decrease in the number of
U.S.-based anonymous gamete providers as the middlemen focus
on contracting for the more valuable access "packages." However,
any negative effect is likely to be negligible for the U.S. gamete
market because the primary appeal of U.S. banks and brokers is the
greater access to information about the source (the data subject or
151 While anonymity does preserve family privacy-by protecting the identity
of the provider and recipient, and "shield[s] the donor from parental obligations,
inheritance claims and unwanted contact with his progeny" -it is distinguishable
from information privacy. EMILY JACKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION: LAW,
TECHNOLOGY AND AUTONOMY 212 (2001). Anonymity prevents middlemen banks
and brokers from disclosing the provider's identity and contact information to the
recipient and ensuing progeny but does not prevent the disclosure of any other
personal information about the provider.
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gamete provider) of the genetic information itself. Without impos-
ing a heavy burden on commerce, this form of regulatory approach
both preserves the increased access to the individual supplier's be-
ing and structures the process so that it is the gamete provider who
retains gatekeeping control over others' access to him or herself.
5. EXTRAPOLATING THE INFORMATION PRIVACY REGULATORY
APPROACH TO A POTENTIAL ORGANS MARKET
Can the information privacy approach successfully be extrapo-
lated from gamete banking to regulate the middlemen in a hypo-
thetical but legal organs market? The gametes market and the ille-
gal organ market share certain similarities, including the global
scope of the commercial activity facilitated by international mid-
dlemen. Local regulations, usually in the form of prohibitions, of-
ten create scarcity in the non-cadaveric supply of organs and
thereby spurs medical procedure tourism.152 Regarding potential
organ sources as data subjects skirts some of the traditional prop-
erty-based justifications for prohibiting sales of kidneys and other
specialized groups of tissue that perform specific functions. For in-
stance, one property-based argument distinguishes between the
sale of gametes (and blood) and organs on the grounds that the
former is regenerative while in the latter case, every living human
body possesses just one spare part: the kidney.153 In other words,
the argument is that the scarcity of body part per human producer
determines whether something should be commoditized. Yet this
argument is easily rebutted when "we narrow organ markets to the
152 See Bill Berkowitz, Health: Poor Countries Raided to Traffic Human Organs,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 27, 2006 ("The rise in illegal transplant tourism.., was
developed to meet an insatiable demand for organ transplants that rises exponen-
tially against a flat supply of organs donated through traditional and regulated
means .... [Ploor people are recruited or entrapped into donating their body
parts to satisfy the demand from rich patients who can afford to travel abroad
and ... to break national laws and international medical regulations to get the or-
gans and medical procedures they need.") (internal quotations omitted).
153 See Bernier & Gr~goire, supra note 90, at 531 (distinguishing human em-
bryos and body parts from sperm and "other human cells that can regenerate and
divide infinitely," on the grounds that donation of the latter does not risk the do-
nor's health thus making the grant of property rights for gametes a "logical and
equitable solution, ... [that] could ensure a better respect for individual auton-
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deceased - dead kidney suppliers have no use for multiple kid-
neys, and no physical risk of harm exists...."154
One construction that sidesteps the issues surrounding prop-
erty-based arguments is to view the act of supplying replenishable
bodily material as a service. While the National Organ Transplant
Act ("NOTA)155 makes the sale of specified organs a felonious act,
there are no state and federal statutes prohibiting one from offering
consideration in exchange for blood or reproductive tissue. The
potential of procuring a fairly continuous flow of body material
such as blood, stamps the monetary exchanges for these body parts
as "compensation for services" rather than consideration for prop-
erty, as construed by common law and state statutes such as the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and Uniform Commercial Code.156
From an information privacy view, arguments based on regen-
erativity align closer to the concept of having "access to a continu-
ous source or supply" than the concept based on whether some-
thing is alienable from the self. However, an information privacy
regulatory approach over middlemen is unlikely to succeed in the
organ trade because of the greatly increased complexity of tissue
processing.
In tissue banking, therefore, the nature and behavior of tissue
processors becomes an issue of importance with regard to tissue
use. There is no equivalent in organ transplantation. Tissue proc-
essing is a highly specialized, technical activity. It requires sub-
stantial capital investment and therefore a large amount of tissue to
operate economically. Many of the processors are for-profit firms.
The complex mix of generally nonprofit tissue procuring banks,
for-profit processors, unregulated pricing, and multiple and con-
flicting final tissue "products" is a major cause of the concerns
154 MICHELE GOODWIN, supra note 3, at 161.
155 National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984)
(stating that the sale of organs is illegal and establishing a task force for the regu-
lation of organ procurement).
156 Armand Karow, Implications of Tissue Banking for Human Reproductive
Medicine, in REPRODUCTIVE TIssuE BANKING: SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES 451 (Armand M.
Karow & John K Critser eds., 1997) ("The primary legal reason for characterizing
these transactions as involving services rather than commodities is to avoid the
specific performance provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and to avoid
liability for transmission of infectious diseases.").
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about ethics in tissue banking and a major impediment to resolving
concerns. 15
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Moreover, the inherent perception of information privacy in
the gametes market stems from the genetic information itself. Ge-
netic information, as the "building blocks or instructions for life"
connotes a stronger sense of access and control over information
that defines our identities. One could argue that organs are com-
prised of tissue which in turn is comprised of cells containing ge-
netic data (DNA). However, the absence of a direct link between
the organ's function and our sense of identity vis-d-vis genetic
makeup makes the transfer of organs an interruption of spatial
privacy rather than information privacy.
6. CONCLUSION
Information privacy concerns the control one has over others'
access to self and his identity-defining information. An analysis of
the gametes industry from the information privacy perspective, as
opposed to the traditional property lens, reveals that the market
shifts to alternately meet the niche demands and idiosyncratic pref-
erences of consumers and the general demand for increased access
to the gamete provider's personal information. The U.S. market
also responds to artificial scarcity imposed by local laws restricting
the extent to which gamete provider information is disclosed or by
those outright prohibiting transfer in the first place. The middle-
man sperm and ova banks enable gamete transfer by engaging in
cross-border information transactions between the providers and
recipients. Varying cultural and religious conceptions of gamete
exchanges around the world makes it unlikely that an international
standard addressing the information privacy of providers will be
promulgated. Thus, federal regulation based on the OECD Privacy
Guidelines and administered by the FDA-the existing authority
over tissue banks- is necessary to ensure that the information pri-
vacy of providers from the United States are not compromised dur-
ing the process. Lastly, this information privacy paradigm is
unique to the gametes market because of the nature of the mid-
dleman's operations and the innate association of reproductive
cells to our sense of being.
157 Jeffrey Prottas, Ethics of Allocation: Lessons from Organ Procurement History,
in TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE: ETHICS, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 120, 129 (Stuart J.
Youngner et al. eds., 2004).
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